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  We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of combinatorial 
auctions and bilateral trades, where the multiple commodities to be traded are possessed 
by participants and a central planner as endowments. Private values, risk neutrality, and 
independent types are assumed. Efficiency, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, and 
Interim Individual Rationality are required. We characterize the least upper bound of the 
central planner’s expected revenue. We introduce a stability notion, namely, the 
marginal core, to the assumption that the central planner’s endowment is unprotected. 
We show that the central planner has a deficit in expectation if and only if the marginal 
core is non-empty. 
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  This paper investigates collective decision problems that have incomplete 
information, namely, combinatorial exchanges. Combinatorial exchanges are regarded 
to unify and generalize both cases of bilateral trades concerning a bargaining aspect of 
trading, such as those investigated by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983),
3 and 
combinatorial auctions, which have been explored by several authors such as Rassenti, 
Bulfin, and Smith (1982), Kelso and Crawford (1982), and Ausubel and Milgrom 
(2002). In the same manner as combinatorial auctions, multiple heterogeneous 
commodities are traded altogether such as spectrums; these commodities are divided 
into multiple packages to be allocated to participants (players), according to a specified 
revelation mechanism with side payments, along with these participants’ 
announcements. 
Combinatorial auctions generally assume that the central planner (mediator or 
government) possesses all the commodities to be traded as his (or her) initial 
endowment. In realistic situations such as spectrum allocations, however, each 
participant’s valuations of these commodities is crucially dependent on his valuations of 
those commodities that are possessed by other participants or himself as their initial 
endowments, which are regarded as substitutes and complements. Hence, the central 
planner expects to improve welfare further by exchanging their initial endowments with 
each other and allocating the central planner’s initial endowment at the same time. 
The framework of combinatorial exchanges does allow tradable commodities to be 
possessed not only by the central planner but also by players as their initial 
endowments; each participant sells his initial endowment and purchases another 
package of commodities at the same time.
4 However, each player has the outside 
opportunity not to participate in the collective decision problem and instead to consume 
his initial endowment by himself; he could thus have significant bargaining power over 
the central planner in this case. Consequently, in order to implement efficient allocations 
                                                  
3 For related studies, such as double auctions, see Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), Wilson (1985), 
and Matsushima (2008), for instance. 
4 For the argument about the importance of combinatorial exchanges, see Milgrom (2007). See also 
Chapter 1 of Milgrom (2004). 3 
 
in an incentive-compatible manner, the central planner has to make considerable 
subsidies that fulfill their informational rents. For instance, as Myerson and 
Satterthwaite (1983) pointed out, in the opposing case of combinatorial exchanges such 
as bilateral trades, where the central planner has no initial endowment to be traded, it 
might be inevitable for the central planner to have a deficit in expected revenue. This 
contrasts with the case of combinatorial auctions, which guarantees the positivity of the 
central planner’s expected revenue. 
  Based on these observations, the purpose of this paper is to clarify the degree of 
financial burden on the central planner when implementing efficient allocations in the 
context of combinatorial exchanges in a manner that is consistent not only with 
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) but also with Interim Individual Rationality 
(IIR). IIR requires each player’s interim expected payoff to be at least the same as his 
type-dependent outside opportunity value. In particular, the main concern of this paper 
is to clarify what is the necessary and sufficient condition under which the central 
planner has a deficit in expected revenue. 
  This paper permits each player’s consumption to have an externality effect on other 
players’ welfare. We assume quasi-linearity, risk-neutrality, private values, and an 
independent distribution of types. We also assume the payoff/revenue equivalence 
property in terms of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, according to which, along with 
efficiency, we can focus only on Groves mechanisms that are consistent with IIR. 
  We derive the least upper bound of the central planner’s expected revenue in 
general collective decision problems. We then show a full characterization of the case 
that the central planner has a deficit in expected revenue in the context of combinatorial 
exchanges from the viewpoint of stability. We introduce a new concept that is a weaker 
version of the core, namely the marginal core, which is defined as the collection of all 
efficient imputations that are unblocked by any coalition that consists of all players but 
a single player, i.e., are marginally unblocked. 
Besides the restriction on possible blocking coalitions, there is a substantial 
difference from the standard definition of the core in that the imputation for the central 
planner is assumed to be zero in our definition; it was assumed in our definition that 
each player’s initial endowment is protected by his private property right, while the 
central planner’s initial endowment is unprotected. This assumption excludes an aspect 4 
 
of the functioning of the competition among players, making the non-emptiness of the 
marginal core difficult to be satisfied whenever the central planner possesses sufficient 
commodities. 
  Based on these observations, we introduce a key condition named Efficient 
Endowment (EE). This condition implies that for each player, there is a particular type 
with which the consumption of his initial endowment by himself is valuable to the point 
that the efficient allocation rule will assign it to him, irrespective of other players’ types. 
The condition of EE makes each player’s bargaining power over the central planner the 
strongest. Under EE, we show that the marginal core is non-empty if and only if the 
central planner has a deficit in expected revenue. 
  This characterization result unifies and generalizes the cases of combinatorial 
auctions and bilateral trades. In combinatorial auctions, where the central planner 
possesses all commodities, it is inevitable that the marginal core is empty, which 
automatically implies that the central planner can earn nonnegative expected revenue. 
By contrast, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) investigated bilateral trades between a 
single seller and a single buyer, where the seller possesses a single unit of an indivisible 
commodity, while the buyer and central planner have no initial endowments. They 
showed that no efficient mechanism satisfies BIC, IIR, or the balanced budgets across 
participants, implying that it is inevitable for the central planner to have a deficit in 
expected revenue. The model of Myerson and Satterthwaite could be regarded as an 
example of a special case of combinatorial exchanges in which the central planner 
possesses no initial endowment. Under the condition of EE, it is inevitable that the 
marginal core is non-empty, automatically implying that the central planner has a deficit 
in expected revenue in any efficient mechanism that is consistent with BIC and IIR. In 
this case, the central planner loses the amount of money equivalent to the maximal net 
expected surplus in the entire economy. 
Based on this characterization, it is shown to be generally impossible to make 
stability in terms of the marginal core compatible with BIC and IIR. Whenever a player 
possesses a sufficient initial endowment, the exclusion of him from the collective 
decision problem results in a decrease in other players’ welfare. By excluding this player, 
they consequently lose the valuable chance to win the commodities that this excluded 
player possessed. This makes the marginal core unlikely to be empty, but, at the same 5 
 
time, allows players to have significant bargaining powers over the central planner, 
making his expected revenue negative. Our characterization implies that the 
non-emptiness of the marginal core is equivalent to the negativity in the central 
planner’s expected revenue. 
The standard definition of the coalitional game has been intensively considered in 
previous studies of combinatorial auctions such as Bernheim and Whinston (1986), 
Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Milgrom (2007), Day and Raghavan (2007), and Day and 
Milgrom (2008). Day and Raghavan (2007) and Day and Milgrom (2008) investigated 
so-called core-selecting mechanisms that have the advantage of stability over a Groves 
mechanism; a core-selecting mechanism assigns to each type profile an imputation that 
is included in the core associated with the standard coalitional game. These works 
commonly defined the stability notion as the robustness of an imputation in terms of the 
possibility of any coalition persuading the central planner to allow its members to 
consume his endowment exclusively. Consequently, the requirement of this stability 
might make the central planner’s revenue greater than that for a Groves mechanism. 
By contrast, the present paper differently defines a stability notion as the existence 
of an imputation that is robust to the possibility of any size ( 1 n  ) coalition conspiring 
to steal the central planner’s initial endowment without his allowance by removing the 
other player. The central planner’s initial endowment is assumed to be unprotected by 
his property right, and he has no means of retaliating for theft, implying that his 
imputation can never be positive. However, in terms of possible retaliation measures, 
the removed player can cancel his participation by withdrawing his initial endowment 
from the collective decision problem, removing the opportunity of its exchange from all 
members of the coalition. Hence, any imputation could be regarded as being stable if 
any size ( 1 n  ) coalition hesitates to conspire to steal the central planner’s initial 
endowment because they are afraid of the removed player’s subsequent retaliation.
5 
We further investigate a special case where a single player possesses all 
commodities as his initial endowment. With minor restrictions, the central planner’s 
expected deficit is the worst of all possible distributions of initial endowments; the loss 
of the central planner’s expected revenue in this single seller case, compared with in the 
                                                  
5 We note that in this case these players cannot enjoy the positive externality effect induced by the 
removed player’s consumption. 6 
 
combinatorial auction case, could be equal to the gross surplus induced by efficient 
allocations. 
We further investigate mechanisms that are not of Groves’ type, and show an 
important result implying that with EE, the emptiness of the marginal core is a 
necessary and sufficient condition under which there exists a Bayesian incentive 
compatible mechanism with Interim Individual Rationality that makes the central 
planner’s ex post revenue nonnegative at all times. 
Several works in the mechanism design literature, such as Cremer and McLean 
(1985, 1988), Matsushima (1990a, 1990b, 2007), and Aoyagi (1999), have investigated 
the correlated types distribution. In particular, Matsushima (2007) showed a sufficient 
condition for the existence of efficient mechanisms that satisfy BIC, IIR, and the 
balanced budgets, implying that the central planner’s expected revenue can be 
nonnegative. In contrast to these works, the present paper assumes the independent 
types distribution rather than correlated types. 
Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) investigated the problem of dissolving 
partnerships as a special case of bilateral trades; players have nearly equal shares in 
their partnership and trade these shares with each other. They showed that the 
achievement of efficiency can be compatible with BIC, IIR, and the balanced budgets. 
Their case, however, does not satisfy EE; the efficient allocation rule always assigns the 
total share to the player who appreciates the value of their partnership more than does 
the other player, contradicting EE. 
Several works, such as Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996), Jehiel, Moldovanu, and 
Stacchetti (1999), and Figueroa and Skreta (2009), have investigated auctions that have 
externality. Figueroa and Skreta (2009) investigated a single-unit auction that has 
externality where each player’s outside opportunity depends on his type. They assumed 
that the central planner can make a binding commitment to make inefficient allocations 
as a device for threatening any player who considers not participating in this auction. In 
contrast to their work, the present paper does not allow any such commitment device; it 
is assumed that the central planner invariably implements efficient allocations for the 
members who actually participated, regardless of whether a particular player decided 
not to participate. 
  The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a 7 
 
basic model for general collective decision problems and demonstrates a calculation 
method for the least upper bound of the central planner’s expected revenue. Section 3 
explains combinatorial exchanges and EE, and describes a tractable characterization of 
the least upper bound. Section 4 describes a main theorem that under EE, the 
non-emptiness of the marginal core is necessary and sufficient for the central planner’s 
deficit in expected revenue. Section 5 considers special cases such as bilateral trades, 
combinatorial auctions, and single seller cases. Section 6 gives several discussions 
about equal endowment distributions, incompatibility with stability, ex post revenue and 
deficit, and an issue concerning complexity and privacy. Section 7 concludes. 
  8 
 
2. The Basic Model 
 
Let us consider a collective decision problem that has incomplete information in the 
following manner. Let  } ,..., 2 , 1 { n N   denote the finite set of players (traders or 
agents), where  2 n  . Each player  N i  has  a  type  ii     that is unknown to either 
other players or the central planner (mediator or government), where  i   denotes the 




i  and  

   
} /{i N j
j i . The types  i   
are  independently distributed across players according to a probability measure that 
have the full support of  . Let  A  denote the set of all alternatives that have typical 
element  a. Each player  s i  payoff function has a quasi-linear and risk-neutral form 
with  private values, i.e.,  (, ) ii i va t   , where  R ti   denotes the monetary transfer 
from the central planner to him and  : ii vA A   is his type-dependent valuation 
function for the alternatives. 
For every  N i  , let 
* : ii UR   denote  player  ' is   outside opportunity function, 
where the outside opportunity for player  i that has type  i   is given by  R U i i  ) (
*  , 
implying the interim expected payoff that he can receive when he does not participate in 
the collective decision problem. Let 
** () Ni i N UU   . 
A direct mechanism is defined as  (,) f x , where  : f A    is an allocation rule, 
:
n x R   is a payment rule,  () iiN xx   , and  : i x R  . When each player  iN   
announces  ii   , the central planner selects the alternative  () f A    and makes 
the transfer payment to each player i , i.e.,  () i x R   , where we denote 
() iiN       and  () (() )
n
ii N x xR    . We assume that the allocation rule  f  is 
efficient  in the sense that for every  , the corresponding allocation  () f A    
maximizes the sum of players’ valuations in the ex-post term, i.e., 
      (() , ) m a x (, ) ii i i aA
iN iN
vf va  


  . 
In order to make the collective decision problem non-trivial, we assume that 9 
 
(1)     
* [( ( ) , ) ] [ ( ) ] 0 ii i i
iN iN
Ev f EU  

    .
6 
This assumption implies that the efficient allocation rule  f  induces a positive net 
expected surplus in the ex-ante term, which is expressed by the left-hand side of (1), 
implying the difference between the expected aggregate value induced by the allocation 
rule, i.e.,  [( ( ) , ) ] ii
iN
Ev f  
  , and the sum of players’ expected outside opportunities, 
i.e., 
* [( ) ] ii
iN
EU 
  . 
 
BIC (Bayesian Incentive Compatibility): A direct mechanism  (,) f x  satisfies BIC if 
for every  N i , every  i i    , and every  i i m   , 
     [(() , ) () | ] [(( , ) , ) ( , ) | ] ii i i i i i i i i i i Ev f x Ev f m x m           . 
 
IIR (Interim Individual Rationality): A direct mechanism  (,) f x  and a profile of 
outside opportunity functions 
*
N U  satisfy  IIR if for every  N i  and  every  i i    , 
* [ ( ( )), ) ( )| ] ( ) ii i i i i Ev f x U      . 
 
BIC implies that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the collective 
decision problem. IIR implies that each player has the incentive to participate in the 
collective decision problem, irrespective of his type. 
The revenue for the central planner is defined as the sum of the transfers from all 




 . Given the efficient allocation rule  f , 
the central planner’s purpose is to design a payment rule  x  such that the associated 




   
under the constraints of efficiency, BIC, and IIR. We implicitly assume that the central 
planner’s preference has a lexicographic order in the sense that the achievement of 
                                                  
6  [] E   denotes the ex-ante expectation operator in terms of  .  [| ] i E    denotes the 
interim expectation operator in terms of  ii     conditional  on  ii   . 10 
 
efficiency is the first aim and revenue maximization is the second aim. 
Let  X  denote the set of all payment rules. A payment rule  x X   is said to be a 
Groves payment rule for an efficient allocation rule  f  if there exists a function 
: ii hR   for  each iN   such  that 
    
\{ }
() (() , ) ( ) ij j i i
jN i
xv f h    

   for  all  . 
Let  () Xf X   denote the set of all Groves payment rules for  f . In the mechanism 
design literature, a direct mechanism  (,) f x  is called a Groves mechanism if and only 
if  () x X f  . It is evident that any Groves mechanism (,) f x  satisfies 
strategy-proofness in the sense that for every  iN   and  every  , 
     ( ( ), ) ( ) ( ( , ), ) ( , ) i i i i iii i ii vf x vfm xm          for  all  ii m  .
7 
It is evident that strategy-proofness implies BIC. 
  This paper implicitly assumes the payoff equivalence property
8 in that for every 
payment rule  x X  , if  (,) f x  satisfies BIC, then there exists a Groves payment rule 
() y X f   that induces the same interim expected values of transfer payment, i.e., 
satisfies that for every  iN  , 
     [() | ] [() | ] ii ii Ex Ey      for  all  ii   . 
This also implies the revenue equivalence property in that 
     [ ( )] [ ( )]
i ii
iN iN
Ex E y   


   . 
Hence, we confine our attention to the subset  () Xf. 
  Let us denote by 
* (, ) () N X fU Xf   the set of all Groves payment rules 
() x X f   such that (,) f x  and 
*
N U  satisfy IIR. Let us denote by 
*
00 () N rr U R   
the  least upper bound of the expected revenue for the central planner under the 
                                                  
7 See Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), Green and Laffont (1977), Holmstrom (1979), 
and Milgrom (2004). A Groves mechanism is sometimes called a VCG (Vickery–Clarke–Groves) 
mechanism. 
8  Krishna and Maenner (2001) showed mild conditions such as convexity and regular 
Lipschitzian that are sufficient for the payoff equivalence property in a broad class of 
environments that have multidimensional types. See also Krishna and Perry (2000), Milgrom 
and Segal (2002), and Bikhchandani et al. (2006). For works related to multidimensional types, 




* (, ) N x XfU  ; 
    
* 0
(, )






  . 
The following theorem characterizes this least upper bound. 
 
Theorem 1: It holds that 
(2)    
*
0 (1 ) [ ( ( ) , ) ] m a x { ( ) [ ( ( ) ,) | ] }
ii
ii i i j j i
iN iN jN
rn E v f U E v f
     

 
      . 
 
Proof: Let us consider an arbitrary Groves payment rule with IIR, 
* (, ) N x Xf U  . For 
every  iN   and  every  ii   , 
     [ ( ( )), ) ( )| ] ii i i Ev f x      
    
\{ }
[(() , ) (() , ) ( ) | ] ij jj i i i
jN i
Ev f v f h      

    
        [( ( ) , ) | ] [ ( ) ] jj i i i
jN
Ev f E h    

  . 
Hence, IIR is equivalent to the inequalities given by 
    
* [( ) ]m a x { () [ (() , ) | ] }
ii
ii i i j j i
jN
Eh U E v f
      

   for  all iN  . 
Hence, 
    
\{ }
[ ( )| ] [ ( ( ), )| ] ii j j i
jN i
Ex E v f    

   
    
* max{ ( ) [ ( ( ), )| ]}
ii
ii j j i
jN
UE v f
   


   for  all iN  . 
This implies that for every 
* (, ) N x Xf U  , 
     [( ) ] ( 1 ) [( ( ) , ) ] ii i
iN iN
Ex nEv f  

    
    
* max{ ( ) [ ( ( ), )| ]}
ii
ii j j i
iN jN
UE v f
   


   . 
Hence, it follows that 
   
*
0 (1 ) [ ( ( ) , ) ] m a x { ( ) [ ( ( ) ,) | ] }
ii
ii i i j j i
iN iN jN
rn E v f U E v f
     

 
      . 
For every  iN  , let us specify  i h   in a manner that 12 
 
    
* [( ) ] m a x { () [ (() , ) | ] }
ii
ii i i j j i
jN
Eh U E v f
      

  , 
that is, 
  
[() ] i Ex
*
\{ }
[ ( ( ) ,) |] m a x {( ) [ ( ( ) ,) |] }
ii
jj i i i jj i
jN i jN
Ev f U E v f
     


   . 
It is clear that the specified payment rule  x   satisfies IIR, and 




* (1 ) [ ( ( ) , ) ] m a x { ( ) [ ( ( ) ,) | ] }
ii
ii i i j j i
iN iN jN
nEv f U Ev f
     

 
     , 
which implies (2).
  Q.E.D. 
 
  From Theorem 1, it follows that for every iN   and every pair of profiles of 
outside opportunity functions 
** (,) NN UU  , if 
    
** () () ii ii UU      for  all iN   and  all  ii   , 
then it holds that 
**
00 () () NN rU rU   ; the higher players’ outside opportunities are, the 
lesser the central planner’s expected revenue is. 
  The proof of Theorem 1 showed that whenever a Groves payment rule  () x X f   
induces the least upper bound of the central planner’s expected revenue, the 
corresponding ex-ante expected payoff for each player  iN  , denoted by 
* () ii N rr U  , 
is given by 
(3)       
* [ ( ( ), )] max{ ( ) [ ( ( ), )| ]}
ii
ii i i i jj i
iN jN
rE v f U E v f
     


   . 
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3. Combinatorial Exchanges 
 
  From this section on, we focus on combinatorial exchanges as a special case of the 
collective decision problem, in which players (mobile phone companies, for instance) 
and the central planner (e.g., the government) possess multiple commodities 
(spectrums) as their initial endowments and trade these objects altogether with each 
other at the same time. 
 
3.1 The Model 
 
 There  exist  L heterogeneous items. For each  {1,..., } lL  , the total amount of the 
lt h   item to be traded is given by a positive integer  0
l e  . Let  1 ()
lL L
l ee R   . We 
specify the set of all alternatives  A  as the set of all nL dimensional vectors of 
nonnegative integers  () iiN aa     satisfying that for every  {1,..., } lL  , 






  , and  0
l
i a   for  all iN  , 
where we denote  1 ()
lL
ii l aa   .
9 
10 Let  () iiN aa A     and  1 ()
lL
ii l aa   , where 
l
i aR   
implies the amount of the lt h   item that is allocated to player i. Let us denote 
() (() ) ii N ff     . For every non-empty subset  SN  , we denote  ()
S
Si i S aa R   . 
 Let  an  L  dimensional vector of nonnegative integers  1 () 0
lL
ii l ee     denote the 
initial endowment for player  iN  . Let us denote by  () Ni i N ee    the profile of their 
initial endowments, where we assume that 






   for  all  {1,..., } lL  . 






    amount of the lt h   item for 
                                                  
9 It is an irrelevant assumption that the set of alternatives is discrete. We can make the same 
arguments even if we replace it with a subset of multidimensional Euclidean space. For the case of 
divisible commodities, see Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993), for instance. 
10  We can make basically the same argument even if we specify  A  as a non-empty proper subset of 
such  nL  dimensional vectors. 14 
 
each item  {1,..., } lL   as his initial endowment; the initial endowments possessed by 
the players and central planner are traded altogether. 
  For every non-empty subset (coalition)  SN  , let us define a subset  () A SA   
as the set of all alternatives  aA   such  that 
     ii ae   for  all iS  , 
implying that any player who belongs to the coalition  S,  iS  , does not participate in 
the collective decision problem and consumes (or utilizes) his initial endowment  i e  by 
himself. Let us specify a function  \ :( )
S
NS f AS  , which is regarded as the efficient 
allocation rule for the difference coalition  \ NS , in a manner that for every 
\\ N SN S   , 
     \ ()
\\
(( ) ,)m a x ( ,)
S
iN S i i i aA S
iNS iNS
vf va  


  , 
where we denote  \ \ N Si iNS     and  \\ \ () NS i iNS NS      . According to 
S f , the 
central planner implements efficient allocations for participants, i.e., players who belong 
to  \ NS , provided that non-participants, i.e., players who belong to  S, consume their 
respective initial endowments. 
  We permit each player’s consumption to have an externality effect on other players’ 
welfare;  (, ) ii va   depends  on  i a .
11  We also assume free disposal in that  (, ) ii va   is 
non-decreasing with respect to  i a . 
  We assume that 
(4)     
*{ } () [ ( ( ) ,) |]
i
ii i i i i UE v f      for  all iN   and  all  ii   . 
Each player  i has the outside opportunity not to participate in the collective decision 
problem and instead to consume his initial endowment  i e  by himself; in this case, the 
central planner allocates the remaining commodities  i ee   in order to maximize the 
sum of other players’ (participants’) expected payoffs and his expected revenue. Under 
Assumption (4), we can rewrite  00 () N rr e   and  () ii N rr e   instead of 
*
00 () N rr U   
                                                  
11 It is implicit in this paper to assume that the market for the players after the combinatorial 
exchange is well regulated so that these players’ aggregate welfare is positively correlated to the total 
surplus including consumers’ welfare. Section 7 gives further discussions. 15 
 
and 
* () ii N rr U  . 
 
Theorem 2: It holds that 




(1 ) [ ( ( ) , ) ][ ( () ,) ]
i
ii j i j
iN iNjN i
rn E v f E v f    
 
     . 
and for each  iN  , 
(6)     
{}
\{ }
[( ( ) , ) ] [ ( ( ) , ) ]
i
ii i j i j
iN jN i




Proof: From (4) and the definition of 
{} i f , it follows that for every  ii   , 
 
   
*() [ ( ( ) , ) |] ii j j i
jN




    
*() [ m a x ( , ) |] ii j j i aA
jN









() [ m a x ( ,) |] ii i i i aAi
iNS





    
*{ } () [ ( ( ) , ) |]
i
ii j i j i
jN




    
{}
\{ }




Ev f   

  , 
which along with Theorem 1 and the arguments in Section 2 implies (5) and (6). 
Q.E.D. 
 
3.2. Efficient Endowment 
 
  A key condition for this paper, EE (Efficient Endowment), can be described as 
follows. 
 
EE (Efficient Endowment): For every  iN  , there exists  ii     such  that 
     (, ) ii i i f e      for  all  ii    . 
 
  EE implies that for each player iN  , there is a particular type  ii     with 16 
 
which the consumption of his initial endowment  i e   by himself is valuable to the point 
that the efficient allocation rule  f   assigns it to him, irrespective of other players’ types. 
EE excludes the case of the dissolution of partnerships investigated by Cramton, 
Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987); the achievement of efficiency was compatible with 
BIC, IIR, and the balanced budgets in their case. 
  Under EE, we can replace Theorem 1 and its related arguments with the following 
theorem, demonstrating a full characterization of the least upper bound of the central 
planner’s expected revenue and the corresponding ex-ante expected payoff for each 
player. 
 
Theorem 3: Under EE, it holds that 




(1 ) [ ( ( ) , ) ][ ( () ,) ]
i
ii j i j
iN iNjN i
rn E v f E v f    
 
     , 
and for each  iN  , 
(8)     
{}
\{ }
[( ( ) , ) ] [ ( ( ) , ) ]
i
ii i j i j
iN jN i




Proof: EE, along with the efficiency of  f , implies that 
    
{} [( ( ) , ) | ] [( ( ) , ) ]
i
jj i j i j
jN jN
Ev f Ev f    

    , 
which along with the proof of Theorem 2 implies that 
* max{ ( ) [ ( ( ), )| ]}
ii
ii j j i
jN
UE v f











Ev f   

  . 
This along with (2) and (3) implies (7) and (8). 
Q.E.D. 
 
  The gross surplus induced by the efficient allocation in the economy without player 
i, i.e., the value of 
{}
\{ }




vf   
 , can be regarded as player  ' is  bargaining 
power over the central planner; the larger his initial endowment is, the lesser the gross 
surplus without him is. 17 
 
  Without EE, it might be the case that the least upper bound  0 r  is greater than the 
right-hand side of (5). EE, i.e., the presence of a particular type  ii     for each 
player  i with which the consumption of his initial endowment  i e  by himself is 
sufficiently valuable, makes each player’s bargaining power over the central planner the 
strongest, i.e., makes the central planner’s financial burden caused by the informational 
incompleteness on players’ types the heaviest. 
 
  18 
 
4. Unprotected Endowment and Marginal Core 
 
  This section demonstrates a full characterization of the case that the central planner 
has a deficit in expected revenue from the following viewpoint of stability. Let us define 
the  coalitional game  :2 \{ }
N R    as assigning to each proper coalition  SN   
the maximal expected gross surplus in the economy without all players who belong to 
\ NS , i.e., 
   




SEv f  

   for  all  2\ { }
N S   . 
where we must note that 
() [ (() , ) ] jj
jN
NEv f  

  . 
 
Theorem 4: It holds that 
0 (1 ) ( ) ( \ { } )
iN
rn N N i 

   , 
and for every  iN  , 
() (\ { } ) i rNN i     . 
Under EE, it holds that 
0 (1 ) ( ) ( \ { } )
iN
rn N N i 

   , 
and for every  iN  , 
() (\ { } ) i rNN i     . 
 
Proof: From the definition of  , Theorem 2, and Theorem 3, it is clear that this 
theorem is correct. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Let us call any  ndimensional vector  ()
n
iiN R     an imputation, where  i   
implies player  ' is  ex-ante expected payoff. It is implicitly assumed that any 
imputation assigns to the central planner zero expected revenue. We define the marginal 
core as the collection of all imputations    satisfying  that 19 
 




  , 
and for every  iN  , 




  . 
The marginal core implies the collection of all efficient imputations that are marginally 
unblocked, i.e., unblocked by any size ( 1 n ) coalition. 
The given definition of a coalitional game is substantially different from the 
standard definition in related studies
12  because the imputation for the central planner is 
assumed to be zero in our definition. This assumption excludes the effect of players 
competing with each other over the central planner’s initial endowment on the stability 
of allocation, threatening the non-emptiness of the marginal core. 
An interpretation of the coalitional game and marginal core follows. The initial 
endowment of each player  iN  , i.e.,  i e , is protected by this player’s private property 




 , is unprotected; 
any size ( 1 n ) coalition can conspire to steal the central planner’s initial endowment by 
removing the other player. In terms of possible retaliation measures, this removed 
player can cancel his participation by withdrawing his initial endowment from the 
collective decision problem, removing the opportunity of its exchange from all 
members of the coalition. Hence, any imputation can be regarded as being stable if any 
size ( 1 n ) coalition hesitates to conspire to steal the central planner’s initial 
endowment because they are afraid of the removed player’s subsequent retaliation. The 
more the central planner possesses his initial endowment, the more likely the marginal 
core is to be empty. 
It is evident that the marginal core is empty whenever the central planner possesses 
all commodities as his initial endowment, as shown in the next section. By contrast, the 
marginal core can be non-empty if the central planner’s initial endowment is sufficiently 
small. 
 
                                                  
12 See Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), and Milgrom (2007). For a 
definition of core-selecting mechanisms, see Day and Raghavan (2007) and Day and Milgrom 
(2008). 20 
 
Theorem 5: The marginal core is non-empty if and only if 
(11)       (1 ) ( ) ( \ { } )
iN
nN N i 

  . 
 
Proof: Suppose that the marginal core is non-empty. Then, there exists 
n R    that 
satisfies (9) and (10). Then, 





















  , 
which implies (11). 
  Suppose that (11) holds. Then, there exists  ( )
n
iiN R      satisfying  that 
(12)     
\{ }




    for  all iN  . 
Let us specify  ( )
n
iiN R     by 












  for  all iN  . 
It is evident that     satisfies (9). From (11) and (12), it follows that 




   , 
and therefore, 
     ii      for  all iN  , 
which along with (12) implies (10). Hence, the marginal core is non-empty. 
Q.E.D. 
 
The following theorem demonstrates the full characterization as the main result of 
this paper; under EE, the non-emptiness of the marginal core is necessary and sufficient 
for the central planner to have a deficit in expected revenue. 
 
Theorem 6: If  0 0 r  , then the marginal core is non-empty. Under EE, the marginal 
core is non-empty if and only if  0 0 r  . 
 
Proof: From Theorem 4, it is evident that  0 0 r    implies (11), and that under EE, 21 
 
0 0 r    is equivalent to (11). This observation along with Theorem 5 implies that this 




  22 
 
5. Special Cases 
 
5.1. Bilateral Trades 
 
Let us consider an example of combinatorial exchanges, namely bilateral trades, in 
which we assume that  2 n   and that the central planner possesses no initial 
endowment, i.e., 
     12 ee e   . 
The model of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) is a special case. They additionally 
assumed a single object with a single unit; EE automatically holds when the type spaces are 
the same between the seller and buyer. 
  In this bilateral trades case, 
    
* (\ { } ) [() ] ii Ni E U     for  each  {1, 2} i , 
which along with Theorem 4 implies that under EE, 




[( ( ) , ) ] [ ( ) ] ii i i
ii
rE v f EU  

   . 
Because of (1), under EE, it is inevitable that the central planner has a deficit in 
expected revenue; the central planner loses the amount of money equivalent to the 
maximal net expected surplus in the entire economy. 
 
5.2. Combinatorial Auctions 
 
  Let us specify a profile of initial endowments  () N Ni i N ee e      by 
     0 i e    for  all iN  , 
which corresponds to combinatorial auctions in which the central planner possesses all 
commodities as his initial endowment. This subsection makes an assumption that 
restricts the positivity of the externality effect in such a weak manner that for every 
iN  , 
     
{}
\{ } \{ }
(() , ) ( ( ) , )
i
jj j i j
jN i jN i
vf vf    

   , where  0 i e  . 
This assumption implies that players prefer to exclude a single player and consume all 23 
 
commodities by themselves. We show that the central planner can earn a positive 
expected revenue as follows. Since 
() A SA   for  all SN  , 
it follows that 
    
:
\{ } 0




Ni v a  

 
   for  all iN  , 
which implies that under EE, 
(13)    
 
00 :
\{ } \{ } 0
() [ ( ( ) ,) m a x ( ,) ]
i
N jj i j aA
iN jN i jN i a
rr e E v f v a  

  
      . 
The assumption of this subsection implies that the right-hand side of (13) is positive. 
 
5.3. Single Seller 
 
  Let us specify another profile of initial endowments  ˆˆ () N Ni i N ee e     by 
     1 ˆ ee  , and  ˆ 0 i e   for  all  \{ 1 } iN  , 
which implies that player 1 possesses the entire commodities as his initial endowment. 
This subsection makes an assumption that restricts the externality effect in such a weak 
manner that for every  iN  , every  ii   , and every  aA  , player  i’s valuation of 
the null package equals zero at all times, i.e., 
     (, ) 0 ii va    if  0 i a  . 
We show that under EE, it is inevitable that the central planner has a deficit in expected 
revenue as follows. Since 
(\ { 1 } ) AN   , and  (\ { } ) A Ni A   for  all  \{ 1 } iN  , 
it follows from the assumption of this subsection that 
    
{1}
1 (() , ) 0 ii vf     for  all  \{ 1 } iN  . 
Hence, 
(\ { 1 } )0 N   , 
and for every  \{ 1 } iN  , 
:
\{ } 0




Ni v a  

 
  , 24 
 
implying that under EE, 
(14)      00 :
\{1} \{ } 0
ˆ () [ ( ( ) ,)m a x ( ,) ]
i
N jj i j aA
iN jN jN i a
rr e E v f v a  

  
     , 
\{1}
(1 ) ( ) ( \ { } )
iN
nN N i 

    , 
which is negative because  f   is efficient. The interim expected payoff for player 1 with 
each type  1    can be given by 
(15)      11 1 1 1 [(() , ) () | ] [ (() , ) | ] jj
jN
Ev f x E v f      

  , 
and the interim expected payoff for each player  \{ 1 } iN   with each type  i   can be 
given by 
(16)      [(() , ) () | ] ii i i Ev f x      
    
:
\{ } 0
[( ( ) , ) m a x ( , ) | ]
i
j ji j i aA
jN jN i a
Ev f v a   

 
  . 
From (15), the interim expected payoff for player 1 is equivalent to the maximal gross 
expected surplus in the entire economy. Hence, player 1 prefers to invite potential 
buyers to the collective decision problem as many times as is possible. From (14) and 
(16), it follows that the least upper bound of the central planner’s expected revenue is 
equivalent to the sum of the expected payoffs for the players other than player 1. The 
central planner’s expected revenue does not necessarily increase as the number of 
players who participate in the collective decision problem increases. The central planner 
might not think positively about inviting new traders to the collective decision problem. 
  With the assumptions made in this and previous subsections, it follows from (13) 
and (14) that under EE, 
    
\{1}
ˆ () () [ m a x ( ,) ] NN j j aA
jN
re re E v a


   , 
implying that by giving all commodities to player 1 gratis, the central planner must 
suffer a decrease of 
\{1}




  in expected revenue; the central planner 
loses the amount of money equivalent to the maximal gross surplus in the combinatorial 
auction that does not have player 1. 




6.1. Equal Endowment Distribution 
 
  This subsection assumes that the sum of the maximal gross surpluses in economies 
without any single players, given by 
{}
\{ }
() (\ { } ) [ ( ( ) ,) ]
i
Nj i j
iN iN jN i
We N i E v f   
 
   , 
is  convex with respect to  N e . This assumption can be implied by the concavity of 
(, ) ii va    with respect to  i a , provided that there is no externality effect. 
  It is evident from this assumption that 








indicating that in symmetric models of combinatorial exchanges, the central planner’s 
deficit can be suppressed when players’ initial endowments are equally distributed 
compared with the case that the distribution of the initial endowment is divided between 
few people such as the single-seller case. The central planner’s expected deficit in the 
single seller case might be the worst of all possible distributions of initial endowments. 
 
6.2. Incompatibility with Stability 
 
  We can show that irrespective of the profile of initial endowments, the central 
planner cannot earn nonnegative revenue in expectation in a compatible manner with 
stability. 
 
Theorem 7: Under EE, there exists no payment rule 
* (, ) N x Xf U   such  that 




   , 
and 
(18)     
\{ }
[{ ( ( ) , ) ( ) } ] ( \ { } ) jj j
jN i
E vf x Ni   

    for all  iN  . 26 
 
 
Proof: From Theorem 6, it follows that under EE, whenever the marginal core is 
non-empty, then there is no 
* (, ) N x Xf U   that satisfies (17). This implies that if a 
payment rule 
* (, ) N x Xf U   satisfies (17), then it never satisfies (18), implying that 
Theorem 7 is correct. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Theorem 7 implies the general impossibility in that under EE, irrespective of the 
profile of initial endowments, no marginally unblocked imputation is induced by any 
Groves mechanism that satisfies IIR and the nonnegativity of the central planner’s 
expected revenue. This supports the statement that participants cannot generally 
accomplish efficiency in voluntary manners. 
 
6.3. Ex-Ante Reallocation 
 
  This subsection describes an aspect of the relationship between an arbitrary pair of 
profiles of initial endowments,  N e  and  N e . Let us denote by 
*() ii U   and 
*() ii U    
the outside opportunities for player i  with type  i   associated with his initial 
endowments  N e  and  N e , respectively. 
  Suppose that a payment scheme 
* (, ) N x Xf U   induces the least upper bound 
0() N re . For every  iN  , let us specify a real number  (,) ii N N dd e e R     by 
    
* max{ ( ) [ ( ( ), )| ]}
ii
ii i j j i
jN
dU E v f





    
* max{ ( ) [ ( ( ), )| ]}
ii
ii j j i
jN
UE v f
   


   . 
By using this specified vector  ()
n
iiN dR   , let us specify another payment rule  x X   
in a manner that for every  iN   and  every  ii   , 
     () () iii x xd     . 
It is evident that  x belongs  to 
* (, ) N X fU    and induces the least upper bound  () N re  . 27 
 
  We can interpret the above observations as follows. Suppose that each player  iN 
possesses  i e  as his initial endowment. At the pre-play stage, the central planner 
collects all commodities possessed by players and then reallocates these collected 
commodities as well as the commodities that the central planner possesses to each 
player  i by giving  i e and the fixed amount of money  i d . After reallocating in this 
manner, the central planner enforces the Groves mechanism (,) f x .  The Groves 
mechanism  (,) f x  associated with the profiles of players’ initial endowments  N e  is 
the payoff/revenue equivalent to the Groves mechanism (,) f x  that follows the 
replacement of  i e  with  i e  accompanied with a type-independent payment  i d  to  each 
player  iN  . 
 
6.4. Ex Post Revenue and Deficit 
 
We must note that even if the central planner’s expected revenue is nonnegative, it 
might be the case that there exists a type profile at which the central planner has a 
deficit in the ex post term. We, however, can easily suppress this trouble by allowing the 
central planner to make an option contract with a risk-neutral third party in a manner 
that whenever players announce any type profile  , then the central planner gives 
this third party an amount of money given by 
     [( ) ] ( ) ii
iN iN
Ex x  

    . 
According to this contract, the central planner’s revenue is kept constant across possible 




  at all times. Hence, with the availability of 
option contracting, Theorem 6 also implies a characterization of the case that the central 
planner’s ex-post revenue is nonnegative at all times. The central planner can earn 
nonnegative revenue in the ex post term at all times if the marginal core is empty. Under 
EE, the central planner can earn nonnegative revenue in the ex post term at all times if 
and only if the marginal core is empty. 
  It would be more important to note that with the assumption of payoff/revenue 
equivalence property, we can construct a non-Groves-type mechanism that is Bayesian 28 
 
incentive compatible, is interim individually rational, and makes the central planner’s 
revenue nonnegative at all times if and only if the least upper bound of the central 
planner’s expected revenue is nonnegative. 
 
Theorem 8: There exists a payment rule  x X   such that  (,) f x  satisfies BIC, 
(,) f x  and 
*
N U   satisfy IIR, and 




   for  all  . 
if and only if  0 0 r  . 
 
Proof
13: It is evident from the revenue/payoff equivalence property that the “only if” 
part is correct. All we have to do is to prove the “if” part. Suppose that  0 0 r  . Hence, 
there exists a Grove payment rule with IIR, 
* (, ) N x Xf U  , such that 




  . 
From Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979), it is evident that there 
exists a payment rule  x X   such  that (,) f x   satisfies BIC and the balanced budgets, 
i.e., 




    for  all  . 
From the payoff/revenue equivalence property, it is evident that there exists a 
n-dimensional vector  ()
n
iiN bR    such  that 
     [ ( ) | ][ ( ) | ] ii ii i Ex Ex b       for  all iN   and  all  ii   . 
Note that 




  . 
We specify another payment rule  x X   by 
     ( ) ( ) ii i x xb      for  all iN   and  all  . 
It is evident from this specification that ( , ) f x  satisfies BIC,  ( , ) f x  and 
*
N U  
                                                  
13 The proof of Theorem 8 is closely related to Krishna and Perry (1998). See also Chapter 5 of 
Krishna (2010). 29 
 
satisfy IIR, and 




       for  all  . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Even without the availability of option contracting, it follows from Theorems 6 and 
8 that the central planner can earn nonnegative revenue in the ex post term at all times 
if the marginal core is empty. Under EE, the central planner can earn nonnegative 
revenue in the ex post term at all times if and only if the marginal core is empty. 
 
6.5. Complexity and Privacy 
 
  The present paper has investigated direct mechanisms in which each player reveals 
full information about his entire valuations. However, direct mechanisms have been 
criticized from the practical viewpoints concerning complexity and privacy.
14 In 
combinatorial auctions that have no externality, several authors have attempted to 
replace the standard practice of such direct revelations with less complicated and more 
privacy-preserved dynamical protocols such as simultaneous ascending/descending 
clock (Japanese) auctions.
15  In such auctions, the auctioneer continues to ask and adjust 
non-anonymous and non-linear price vectors to each player (buyer), and each player 
continues to make his demand correspondences as a price taker. Such protocols must 
collect sufficient information in order to achieve the allocations of the original direct 
mechanism while preserving players’ privacy. 
In combinatorial auctions that have no externality, Lahaie and Parkes (2004), 
Parkes (2006), and Mishra and Parkes (2007) have introduced the concept of a universal 
competitive equilibrium, which implies the competitive equilibrium properties not only 
in the entire economy but also in economies without a single buyer. These studies 
showed that a pivot  mechanism, which is defined as a special version of a Groves 
                                                  
14  See Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990), Segal (2006), Ausubel and Milgrom (2006), and 
Parkes (2006), for instance. 
15 See Kelso and Crawford (1982), Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 
2000), Parkes and Ungar (2002), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Ausubel and Cramton (2004), Lahaie 
and Parkes (2004), Ausubel (2004, 2006), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Ausubel, Cramton, and 
Milgrom (2006), Parkes (2006), Mishra and Parkes (2007), and Matsushima (2011), for instance. 30 
 
mechanism, can be implemented by an arbitrary dynamical protocol that always collects 
sufficient information in order to discover a universal competitive equilibrium. 
Subsequently, Matsushima (2011) showed a tractable method for explaining whether an 
arbitrary dynamical protocol can implement a pivot mechanism and clarifying its degree 
of privacy preservation. 
This subsection briefly shows that the above arguments can be extended to 
combinatorial exchanges that have no externality, where  (, ) ii va   is assumed to be 
independent of  i a ; thus, we write  (, ) ii i va  instead of  (, ) ii va  . Let us specify a 
Groves payment rule  () x xX f   by 
   
({ })
\{ }
() [m a x ( ,) ] ii j j j aAi
iN jN i
hE v a    

   for  all iN   and  ii   . 
The corresponding direct mechanism  (,) f x , which can be called a pivot mechanism, 
satisfies strategy-proofness as well as ex-post individual rationality in the sense that for 
every  iN   and  every , 
     
* (() , ) () () ii i i i i vf x U     . 
This inequality holds with equality whenever  () ii f e   . Let us denote  : i p AR    
and  () iiN pp   , the latter of which is called a price vector. A price vector  p  is said 
to be a universal competitive equilibrium for   if there exist 
* aA  , and 
* ({ })
j aA j   for  each  j N  , such that for every  aA  , 
     




  , 
     
** (,) () (,) () ii ii ii ii va pa va pa     for  all iN  , 
for every  j N   and  every  ({ }) aAj  , 
     
*




iN j iN j
pa pa

  , 
and 
     
** (, ) () ( , ) ( )
jj
ii ii ii ii va pa va pa     for  all  \{ } iN j  . 
Note that 
     
* (,) (,) ii i ii i
iN iN
va va  

   for  all aA  , 31 
 
and for every  j N  , 
     
*
\{ } \{ }
(, ) ( , )
j
ii i ii i
iN j iN j
va va  

   for  all  ({ }) aA i  , 
implying that 
* aA   is an efficient allocation in the entire economy and 
* j aA   is 
an efficient allocation in the economy that does not have player  j . In the same manner 
as described by Lahaie and Parkes (2004), Parkes (2006), and Mishra and Parkes (2007), 
it can thus be shown that without externality, the pivot mechanism can be implemented 
using an arbitrary dynamical protocol if and only if this protocol always discovers a 
universal competitive equilibrium. 
  We can also extend the argument of Matsushima (2011) to combinatorial 
exchanges. Matsushima (2011) introduced the concept of the representative valuation 
function for each player, which assigns the minimal relative valuation to each package 
that has been revealed during the history of play. This representative valuation function 
can easily be calculated from the history of play by making minor assumptions such as 
revealed preference activity rules and connectedness and by describing the degree of 
players’ privacy preservation. In the same manner as shown in Matsushima (2011), in 
combinatorial exchanges that do not have externality, the pivot mechanism can be 
implemented by an arbitrary dynamical protocol if and only if (i) there always exist 
efficient allocations in the entire economy and in economies that do not have single 
players associated with the calculated representative valuation function profile and (ii) 
the packages that compose these allocations have all been revealed during the history of 
play. We can also show that whenever the dynamical protocol implements the pivot 
mechanism, the resulting representative valuation function profile can be the universal 
competitive equilibrium for their true types. 32 
 
7. Conclusion and Future Researches 
 
  The present paper investigated combinatorial exchanges that have incomplete 
information, in which, in contrast to standard combinatorial auctions, the multiple 
heterogeneous commodities to be traded are possessed not only by the central planner 
but also by players as their initial endowments. Each player thus has the outside 
opportunity not to participate in the collective decision problem and instead to consume 
his initial endowment by himself. According to the payoff/revenue equivalences 
assumption, we focused on Groves mechanisms that are compatible with IIR. 
  Compared with standard combinatorial auctions, players in combinatorial 
exchanges that possess non-negligible initial endowments can have significant 
bargaining powers over the central planner, making it difficult for the central planner to 
earn nonnegative expected revenue. We introduced the key condition of EE, which 
implies that for each player, there is a particular type with which the consumption of his 
initial endowment by himself is valuable to the point that the efficient allocation rule 
will assign it to him, irrespective of other players’ types. Under EE, each player’s 
bargaining power over the central planner is at its strongest. According to the standard 
calculation for Groves mechanisms, we characterized the least upper bound of the 
central planner’s expected revenue. Subsequently, from the viewpoint of stability, we 
showed a full characterization of the case that the central planner had a deficit in 
expected revenue. The marginal core, which was defined as the collection of all efficient 
imputations across players that are marginally unblocked by any size ( 1 n ) coalition, is 
empty if and only if the central planner can earn nonnegative expected revenue. 
  Based on this characterization, it was shown to be generally impossible to make 
stability in terms of the marginal core compatible with BIC and IIR. Whenever a player 
possesses a sufficient initial endowment, the exclusion of this player from the collective 
decision problem results in a decrease in other players’ welfare; by excluding this player, 
they consequently lose the valuable chance to win the commodities that this excluded 
player possessed. This makes the marginal core unlikely to be empty, but, at the same 
time, allows players to have significant bargaining powers over the central planner, 
making his expected revenue negative. Our characterization implies that the 33 
 
non-emptiness of the marginal core is equivalent to the negativity in the central 
planner’s expected revenue. 
  This paper assumed that the central planner’s preference followed a lexicographic 
order in that the achievement of efficiency is the first aim and revenue enhancement is 
the second aim. Future research might wish to eliminate this assumption and instead 
investigate the possibility that the central planner can increase his expected revenue 
further by employing inefficient mechanisms. This research avenue is needed in order to 
provide an insight into designing protocols for combinatorial exchanges that are optimal 
in terms of the central planner’s expected revenue (see also Myerson (1981) and Riley 
and Samuelson (1981)). In realistic situations, the central planner should be constrained 
by the fact that all commodities are sold out to third parties. It might be also practically 
important to consider the manner in which the central planner collects the proportion of 
the initial endowments possessed by players in the pre-play stage in order to reduce the 
deficit at the expense of efficiency. 
  As footnote 10 pointed out, this paper has implicitly assumed that the market for 
players after the combinatorial exchange is well regulated so that these players’ 
aggregate welfare is positively correlated with total surplus including consumer welfare. 
Without this assumption, we would need to be more cautious about the central planner’s 
objective function concerning both the central planner’s revenue and total surplus (i.e., 
consumer surplus as well as player welfare). This is another reason why future research 
should investigate inefficient allocation rules. 
  This paper has investigated only static models of combinatorial exchanges. Thus, a 
highly promising future research avenue would be to extend our model to dynamical 
contexts where players receive private information over time, where the population of 
participants could change over time, and where commodities could be resold. For 
related works, see Parkes and Singh (2003), Bergemann and Välimäki (2010), and 
Bergemann and Said (2010), for instance. 
  Finally, it must be noted that this paper assumed that players are fully rational and 
require direct mechanisms to satisfy BIC so that truth-telling is exactly the best response 
for any player. According to the seminal works of Parkes, Kalagnanam, and Eso (2002), 
Day and Milgrom (2008), and Erdil and Klemperer (2010), future research might aim to 
weaken this rationality assumption and instead investigate the case that the central 34 
 
planner attempts to design efficient mechanisms that do not satisfy BIC but keep any 
player’s gain from lying to a sufficiently small degree. 
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